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3. IJarzk Failures
The preceding account gives a prominent place in the sequence of events
during the contraction to the successive waves of batik failures. Three
questions about those failures deserve further attention: %Vhywere the
bank failures important? What was tie origin of the bank failures? What
ss as tie attitude of the Federal Reserve System toward the bank failures?
ROLE OF RANK FAILURES
The bank failures had two different aspects. First, they involved capital
losses to l:oth their owners and their depositors, just as the failure o1
any other group of business enterprises involved losses to their owners
and creditors. Second, given the policy followed by the Reserve System,
the failures were the mechanism through which a drastic decline was
produced in tie stock of money. Which aspect was the more important
for the course of business?
For the United States, the two aspects were so closely related that
it may seem impossille to distinguish theni and to judere theirseiaaraie
effects. But even for the United States alone, a few figures serve to
show that the second was . astiv more important than the first. Regarded
solely in their first aspect, the failures imposed losses totaLing about $2.5
billion on stockholders, depositors and other creditors of tile more than
9,000 banks that suspended operations during the four years from 1930
through 1933. Slightly more than half the loss fell on depositors, tile rest
on other creditors and stockholders.6' A loss of $2.5 ljillionis certainly
sizable, yet by itself it would not entitle bank failures to the amount of
attention we and other students of the period have devoted to them.
By comparison, &ver the same four years, the value of all preferred
and common stock in all enterprises in the United States is estimated to
have declined by $85 billion. Or, to make a different comparison, tie de-
cline in the total value of all shares listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change in October 1929 is estimated to have been nearly $l51biIliots.2
As a fraction of total wealth, the losses produced by bank failures were
minor and would deserve no imsore attention than losses of a comparable
amount in. say. real estate.
Loss to depositors, estimated at SI I billiofl (unpublished FDIC estimates: see
ourcst notes to Table 16, partI)lOSS to other crcditoris a rough guessloss
totockhølder,, estimatesi at .509 tilliots (Federal Re.'erre Bulletin. Sept.1937,
p. 897). A sizable traction of the loes was not realized until after the end of the
banking holiday. Of the more than9.000banks that suspended in the years Iron
1910through 1933. more than 3,500 suspended after Mar. IS, 1933.
!Iistortcal Statistics of the (Jutted States, Colonial Times to1957,Bureau of













































Enthe sccoridaspect, the situationis entirely differentThe total stock of monet fellby over one-third front1929 to 1933conlrnercial bank dcpo515 fell b'over 42 per cent; in absoluteamount, they fell S18 hi!- lion. lotal depositsin suspended banksalone were much largc'rthan losses, CIOSC to $7 hll100in the same fouryears. If the bank failuresdeses'e special attentionitis clearly becausethey were the mechanismthrough which the drasticdecline in the stockof mone' wasproduced anti be- cause the stock ofmones' plays animportant role in economic desClop. meets The bank failureswere important not primarilyin their own right, hut because of theirindirect effect. If theyhad occurred toprecisel. the same extent withoutproducing a drastic declinein the stock ofmoney, t1iv would have beennotable hut not crucialIf the' hadnot occurred but a Correspondjnl.sharp decline hadbeen produced in thestock of money by Sortie othermeans, the contractionwould have beenat least equally severe andprobably even moreso.
Persuasive es idece. forthis final statemisentis provided byCanadian experience Canada hadnc bank failures at all durinethe depression; its 10 banks with 3,000-odd
branches througho0 theCountry did not evenex- Peitence any runs, although,presumably as a preventivePleasurean ees enth Chartered bankwith a small numberof brancheswas merged with a larger bank inMay 1931. Butbecause Canada kept itsexchange rate with the United Statesfixed until Britainleft the goldstandard in September 1931 and thenmaintained its exchangerate at a new level in- volving a smaller depreciationthan that undergoneby the poundsterling, its internal level of incomeand its stock ofmoney had to adjust tomain- tain external equilibrium.Though the requiredfail in both pricesand in- come ssas shaip. the depreciationof the Canadianexchange rateper- mitted thepercentage fail to be somewhatsmaller than that inthe United States. The £tock ofmoney fell sharply also, butbs' a much smallerl)tr- centas-'e than in the UnitedStates Evet thesmaller fallwas hosves er, nearl' one and a halftimes as largeas the fall in an'contraction in U S history since the CivilWar except onlythe 1929-.33contraction So it can hardly be regardedas minor. The relevantgures are as follossS:63
Percent0ec(-Jecline,
19Y4-33
(.cited States Canada Stockof money
33 13 Nt natsonalproduct 53 49
29 41
Except for the Canadian
currency component whichisan uncenteced annual aserage of monthly data,money stock figuresare annual average5ofmonthjs data. centered on June30.Canadian data aresums of demand notice,and pre- incialgosernnlentdepo5ltsin chartered banks. minuS








































Why was the decline in the stock of money so much sharper in the
United States relative to the decline in income titan it was in Canada? Or,
alternatively, why did not the stock of money in Canada have to fall much
more sharply than it did to be consistent with so sharp a decline in
income? The reason for the difference is, we believe, primarily the effect
of the U.S. hank failures themselves. The bank failures made deposits a
much less satisfactory form in which to hold assets than they had been
before in the United States or than they remained in Canada. That, of
courseis the reason they produced such a shift in the deposit-currency
ratio in the United States. While currency was an alternative, it was not
afully satisfactory alternative, otherwise deposits would never have
constituted so large a fraction of the total stock of morley. Hence the
demand for the sum ofdeposits and currency was reduced by the
diminished attractiveness of depositsan effect of the hank failures not
heretofore considered. Of course, that effect was not strong enough to
offset completely the increased demand for money relative to income
as a result of the other factors associated with the contraction, such as
the great increase in uncertainty, the decline in attractiveness of equities
and real goods, and so on (see Chapter 12)If it had been, the amount
of money would have fallen by a larger percentage than income fell, i.e.,
velocity would have risen rather than have fallen as it did. But the effect
was strong enough to make the decline in velocity decidedly smaller in
the United States than in Canada, where the same effect was not present.
In Canada, deposits remained as attractive as they had ever been, and
there was accordingly no reduction in the demand for money from this
source. The other factors increasing the demand for money had full
scope.
Paradoxically, therefore, the bank failures,by their effect on the
demand for money, offset sonic of the harm thv did by their effect on the
supply of money. That is why we say that, if the same reduction in the
stock of money had been produced in some other way, it would probably
have involved an even larger fall in income than the catastrophic fall
that did occur.
ORIGIN OF BANK FAILURES
The issue that has perhaps received the most attention centers on the
reasons for the bank failures. Did they arise primarily from thefinancial
practices of the preceding years? Or were thie' produced by the develop-
ments of the early thirties? Even if the first view were correct, the
indirect monetary consequences of the failures are separable from the
failures as such and need not have been also the near-inevitable con-
sequences of the developments of the twenfiet. As we have just seen, it was
the indirect consequences that were the most irnportant effect of the
bank failures.
) I- t'--1c--'- ,,;A
TI-fE CREAT CONTRACTION
As noted in Chapter6, thereis sonic evidence that thequality of loans and investmentsmade h' individuals, banks,and other fInancial
institutions deterioratedin the late twenties relativeto the early twenties in the ex antesense that, had the later loans andinvestments beensubject to the same economicenvironment as the earlierones, they would have displayed a higher ratio oflosses through default. Theevidence for such deteriorationisfullysatisfactoi-s'only for foreignlending.For the rest, the studies made havenot satisfactorily separated, andsome hate not even recognized the differencebetween the cx antedeterioration in the sense just specified, and thecx post deterioration thatoccurred becati the loans and investmentscame to fruition and hadto he repaid in the midst of a major depression,Loans and investments,identical in eve- respect except the 'ear made,would have faredworse if made in the later than if made in theearlier twenties, By theirconcentration onCxpost experience, authors ofmost of the studiesunquestionably exaggera whatever difference incx ante quality therewas. Indeed, mans' ofthe results are consistent withno deterioration at all incx ante quality. If the evidence istinsatisfacto.y for loans andinvestments ingeneral, it is even sparser andmore unsatisfacto, for theioans and investmentsof commercial banks in particularAnd there issome reason to belierthat the experience of banksmay have been differentfrom that ofother lenders. During thelater'ears of the twenties,particularly in 1928and 1929, bankswere under steads'reserve pressure, Aswe have seen, their total depositswere roughly constant fromearly 1928 to afterthe cyclical peak in August 1929.Whatever thc' 'nighthave done in thegenerally op. timjstjc and exuberantenvironment of the tinieif they had beenmore plentifully. supplied withreserves, they had no choicebut to he highly selective in their loansand investments









































and, indditinn, dpnc!ti in Cfl!flrnorcia! banks rose by 5 to 6per cent
rather than falling as the5 (lid from 1929 to 1930.
The great surge in hank failures that characteriied the fist banking
crisis after october 1930 mas' possibly have resulted from poor loans and
investments made inthe twenties. After the fajluce ofthe Bank of
United States in December 1930, Governor Harrison told his board of
directors (hat 'the Reserve Bank had been wot king for a year or more to
improve conditions in the Bank of United States, although there was no
evidence that the condition of the bank was impaired,' and J. H Casc,
chairman of the board, said the bank's condition was probably not satis-
factory in July l929."However, the subsequent pay-out record during
the liquidation of the Bank of United States suggests that, if there was any
pemianent impairment of assets at the time the bank failed,it could
not have beersreat.
Whatever may have been true of the initial bank failures in the first
hankinccrisis, any cx ante deterioration in the quality of loans and in-
vestments in the later twenties or simply the acquisition of low-quality
loans and investments in that period, even if no different in quality than
in earlier periods, was a minor factor in the subsequent bank failures. As
we have seen, the banking system as a whole was in a position to meet the
demands of depositors for currency only by a multiple contraction of de-
posits, hence of assets. Under such circumstances, any runs on banks for
whatever reason became to some extent self-justifying, whatever the
quality of assets held by banks. Banks had to dump their assets on the
market, which inevitably forced a decline in the market value of those
assets and hence of the remaining assets they held. The impairment in the
market value of assets held by banks, particularly in their bond port-
folios, was the most important source of impairment of capital leading to
bank suspensions, rather than the default of specific loans or of specific
bond issues.55 As W. R. Burgess. at the time a deputy governor of the
Harrison, Notes, Vol. I, Dec. 18, 1930.
The president of Federation Bank and Trust Company, closed by the New
York State Superintendent of Banks on Oct. 30, 1931. explained that the bank
had prpered for many years "arid as a matier of fact right up to the past few
months, when due to the nationwide rapid and unforeseen depreciation in bonds
and other securities, the falling away in valises of the bonds and securities owned
by the comnany impaired the hank's capital structure" (Comroercia! and Financial
Chronicle, Nov. 7, 1931. p. 3038.
In his conitemporam' account of the Arnrri,'an banking System. R. \V. Goldsmith
wrote: "The depression of bond values, which started as far hack as 1929 in the
field of urban real estate bonds and reached foreign bonds and land bank bonds
in the course oI 193!. began to endanger she whole banking structure and notably
the large city banks the moment first.grade bonds were affected in a most drastic
was': From the middle of 1931 to the middle of 1932, railroad bonds lost neatly
36 per cent of their marker value, public utility bonds 27 per cent, industrial
bonds 22 per cent, foreign bonds 15 per cent, and even United States Government
securities 10 per cent"R. W. Goldschmidt [Goldsmith. The Changing Structure
59THE GREAT CONTRAflON
New Voik Reservc Bank,told the Bank's boardof directors in Febiva, 9'I, the chiefp 'bk'rtt confrontiiig mans' bankswas the severe depre. ciatton in their bondaccounts; "given a better bondmarket and risin bond prices, the condition of banksnow jeopardiie'J by deprecia,ji in their bandaccounts would, in manycaseS,improve automatieaIl.be- yond the point ofimmediate danger."Because there wasan actisv market for bond.s andcontinuoUs quotation of theirprices, a bank's capital was more likely to be impaired,in the iudginent of bankexaminers, when it held bonds thatwere expected to be andwere honored in lull when due than when it heldbonds for which therewas no good market and few quotations. So longas the latter did notcome due, they were likely to be carried on the booksat face value;ofllyactual defaults orpost- ponements of payment would reducethe examiners' evaluation.Para- doxically, therefore,assets regarded by tile banksas particularly liquid and as providing themwith a secondaryreserve turned out to offerthe most serious threat to theirsolvency,
The most extremeexample of the proces.swe have been describiny is the experience afterBritain left the goldstandard. The declineof 10 per cent in the price ofgovernment bonds and of 20per cent irs the price of high-gradecorporate bonds (noted inthe prehilr,inar'memorar,dum for the January Il,1932, 'fleeting of theOpen Market PolicyConference, cited earlier't clearlydid not reflectany deterioration in the qualityof credit in the twentiesor "bad" banking ir.any meaningful sense ofthe term.Itreflected the inevitableeffect of the enforceddumping of bod5 by banks toreduce the volumeof their assets bya large t1tultipe of the amount ofadditional currencysupplied to depositors. If deterioration ofcredit qualityor bad bankingwas tIretriEger, which it may tosome extent have been, thedamaging bullet it discharged was the inability of the bankingsystem to acquire additionalhigh-powered mone%' to meet the resultingdemands of depositorsfor currency, without a multiple contraction ofdeposits. That inabilitywas responsible alike for the extent andimportance of hankfailures and for theindirect effect hank failures hadon the stock ofmoney. In the absence ofthe pros ision of additiosia!high.powermoney, banks that sufferedruns as a result
of4'flcBankingLondon Routledge1933, p.106). We are indebtedto anuel Cott1jb for thisreference
Commenting on bar-ksuspe sions in 1932, BrayHammond wrote- 'Thesitua- tion had workedto the point where the
stronger banks were beingdragged dossn bs' the weaker banks
partly because thelatter dress'onthe (ocr forre5ees and partly because theforced liquidationof portfoliosbybanks in dicul,jcsimnaired the valueofportfolio3 of all otherbanks" ('HistoricalIntroduction"Banking
SfudBoard of Goserors of the Federal Reserve











































of the initial failure ol "badbanks would not have been helped Iw
holding solely U.S. government securities inaddition to required reserves.
If the composition of their assetsdid not stop the runs simply by its effect
on depositors'confidence, the banks would still have had to dump their
government securities on themarket to acquire needed high-powered
money. and manywould have failed.85 Alternatively, the composition of
assets held by bankswould hardly have mattered if additional high-
powered money had been made available from whatever source to meet
the demands of depositors for currencywithout requiring a multiple con-
traction of deposits and assets. The triggerwould have discharged on1v a
blank cartridge. The banks would havebeen under no necessity to dump
their assets. There would have been nomajor decline in the market
prices of the assets and no impairment in thecapital accounts of banks.
The failure of a few bad bankswould not have caused the insolvency
of many other banks arty more titan during the tsveittCSwhen a large
number of banks failed. And even if anabnorma1l' large number ct
banks had failed because they werebad, imposing losses on depositors,
other creditors, and stockholders, comparable tothose actually imposed,
that would have been only aregrettable occurrence and not a catastrophe
if it had not been accompanied by amajor decline in the stock of money.
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM'S ATTITUDE
The failure of the Bank of United Statesprovoked much soul searching
by the directors of the New YorkReserve Bank. They devoted meeting
after meeting from mid-December 1930 toApril 1931 to discussions of the
responsibilities of the Reserve Bank with respect tomember bank sus-
pensions and of the actions it could take to preventthem. They were well
aware of the serious shockthe failures had administered to confidence not
only in commercial banks but also inthe Federal Reserve System. Owen
D. Young. then deputy chairman ofthe board of directors of the New
York Bank, repeated to his fellow directors theremark of an upstate New
York banker that the failure of theBank of United States "had shaken
confidence in the Federal Reserve System morethan any other occurrence
in recent sears,"At the first joint meeting of the FederalReserve Board
and the Open Market Policy Conferenceafter the banking difficulties had
developed, Adolph Miller. a member of theBoard, commented that
"the banking situation was nets' moreimportant titan the credit situn-
' Of course, had banks held onit' U.S. governmentSecurities in addition to their
requird reserves, the Rer.'e System wouldhave been under much greaser pres-
sure than it was to intervenehe providing additional high-powered money to sup-
port the prices of those securities.But thatis an aspect of the problem wholly
different from the effect of the possibledetertoration of credit quaIiy.
Harrison, Notes. Vol TI Aug 13. 1931.
ii ITHE GREAT CONTRACTION
ton, and asked what thegovernors were planning to do indifferent trictsif further banking troublesrartcd."The minutes ofdirecto15 meetings of the New York Bankand memoranda prepared formeetings of the Open Market PolicyConference reveal that tiretechnical personnel of the Batik and the Boardwere fully aware of the interconnecriorbetwes'n the banking and the creditsituations, and of the effectsof the liquidatio11 of securities to meet thedemands of depositors.Repeatedly during the next two years, the problem ofbank failures and hanksupervision was discussed at meetings within theSystem.









































per cent werenonrnernbers. (4) The relatively fe'; iarge member banks
that failed at the end of 1930 were reerJedby many Reserve officials
as unfortunate cases0!':.management and therefore not subject to
correction by cmtral bank action.1
1'September 1931, when Governor Harrison convened a meeting of
commercial bankers to discuss means of making deposits in closed banks
available, he recalled that "at one time it was the feeling of many of us
down town that the effects of the failure of- small banks in the com-
munity could be isolated," but "it was clear that the continued cicsing
of institutiOflS in the cityis now having senmuus repercussions
4. International Character of the Contraction
In 1929, most countries of the 'Nesternworld had returned to a monetary
standard involving fixed exchange rates between different national cur-
rencies. The standard was widely known as the gold-exchangestandard be-
cause many countries kept their monetary reservesin the form of balances
of other currencies convertible into gold atfixed prices, notably sterling
and dollars, rather than in the form of golditself. Official aeencies in
such countries, usually the central banks,often fixed exchange rates
directly by standing ready to buy or sell the national currency atfixed
rates in ternis of othercurrencies, rather than indirectly by standing ready
to buy or sell gold at Fixed pncesin terms ot the national currency.
Since the gold-exchange standard, like the goldstandard, involved
fixed exchange rates, it also nseant that, so long as thestandard was
maintained, prices and incorns in different countries were intimately
connected. They had to behave so as to preserve a roughequilibrium in
the balance of payments among the countries.The use of the gold-ex-
change standard did mean, however, thatthere was less leeway in the
adjustments among countniesthe roughequilibrium could not be quite
so rough as under thefull gold standard. Theold-exchange standard
rendered the international financial system morevulnerable to disturb-
ances for the sante reasonthat the risein the deposit-reserve ratio
rendered the domestic monetary systemmore vulnerable: becauseit
raised the ratio of claimmis on the relevanthigh-powered moneyin this
case, ulttmateiy, goldtothe amount of high-powered money available
to meet those claims.
The links forged by the fixed rates of exchangeensured a worldwide de-
cline in income and prices after 1929.just as the links forged by the
less rigidly fixed exchange rates in 1920ensured a worldwide decline
then. No major contraction involving asubstantial fall in prices could
develop in an' one country without thoselinks enforcing itstrans-
" We are indebted to Clark Warburton for thisparagraph
"Harrison, Office, Vol. 11, Sept. 11, 1931.
1j1